Deportation and returns of unauthorised migrants from the UK

This briefing examines returns of people without a legal right to be in the UK, including enforced removals and voluntary departures. It presents statistics on the numbers and characteristics of people who are returned from the UK.

How many unauthorised migrants are removed from the UK?

Around 38,000 people without the right to be in the UK were recorded leaving in 2025 – 9% more than in 2024, and the highest number since 2016. Returns fell sharply in the second half of the 2010s, declined further during the pandemic, then began to recover. However, in 2025 numbers remained slightly lower than a decade before.

Almost a third of all returns in 2025, or 12,000 departures, were independent returns, where a person leaves of their own accord and where the government does not actively participate. Independent returns increased sharply immediately after the pandemic. They fell 17% in 2025, although final numbers may be revised upwards in the future as more departures are recorded administratively. The reasons for slowing independent returns are not entirely clear, but may result in part from falling migration from 2024 onwards.

Returns involving the Home Office reached 26,000 in 2025, 27% higher than the year before. Among these returns with government involvement, the majority were voluntary. Enforced returns increased by 21% in 2025 to around 10,000. Meanwhile, voluntary returns monitored or facilitated by the government rose 32% in 2025 to the highest number on record.

The Home Office prefers voluntary returns, partly because they are much cheaper. Enforced returns cost an average of £48,800 in the 2024/25 financial year, compared to £4,300 for a voluntary return.

While returns have increased since Labour took office, it is difficult to know how much of the increase results from new policies like increased resources for Immigration Enforcement, and how much is just a continuation of trends we saw under the previous government (see Understanding the Policy).

Figure 1

Most returnees from the UK are men – around three quarters of the total in the last twenty years. Similarly, 85% of returnees during this period were aged 18 to 49. This may simply reflect the composition of the unauthorised migrant population in the UK, though current data cannot establish whether some groups of people, such as men, are more likely to be removed than others.

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Why did returns fall in the 2010s before recovering in the 2020s?

It remains unclear exactly why returns declined so much during the 2010s, before rebounding in the early 2020s, though several factors have been put forward to explain the changes.

Higher enforcement costs and fewer resources available to Immigration Enforcement likely contributed to the fall in returns during the 2010s. Spending on Immigration Enforcement fell by 19% in real terms between 2014/15 and 2020/21 (Figure 2). Costs increased rapidly during this period, particularly for enforced removals. These often require chartered flights and trained staff, limiting the number of possible returns within a given budget. The average cost of an enforced return rose from around £15,000 to almost £49,000 in the decade to 2023/24. Costs of voluntary returns also increased from £1,000 to more than £4,000.

Increased resources may have contributed to the rise in returns during the early 2020s. Immigration Enforcement funding rose to £833m in the 2024/25 fiscal year, 69% higher than in 2022/23 and more than reversing previous cuts. The number of staff working in Immigration Enforcement also rose sharply in 2024/25 – from 5,300 to 7,100 – after the government redeployed staff from other parts of the Home Office.

Figure 2

Several other factors are likely to have influenced changes in return numbers:

• Legal challenges. An increase in legal challenges to removal is likely to have played a role in the decline of returns during the 2010s, though limited data prevent a definitive assessment. A report from the National Audit Office showed that 52% of enforced return attempts were cancelled in 2019, up from 11% in 2013 – a rise the authors say is “mostly explained” by last-minute asylum claims and legal challenges. The Home Office indicated that at least one legal issue was raised in 73% of detentions in 2019, with the majority of these being unsuccessful.
• Changes in referrals to Immigration Enforcement. One potential reason for the decline in returns during the 2010s is that fewer people eligible for removal were referred to the authorities. For instance, one group of people who are referred to Immigration Enforcement are those who apply for an extension of stay in the UK and are refused. Refusals of extensions of stay fell by 93% between 2013 and 2020, driven by a lower refusal rate. This may have meant there were fewer opportunities to conduct relatively straightforward returns, involving people who may not have lived in the UK for long periods. Similarly, the increase in returns after 2021 may have partly resulted from more recent migrants becoming liable for removal, after a sharp increase in both legal and unauthorised migration to the UK. Recent migrants will generally be easier to remove than people who have lived in the UK for a long time and developed connections here.
• Administrative problems and delays. Administrative problems can also affect returns, though their impact is hard to quantify due to a lack of data. The Home Office reported that at least one legal issue was raised in 73% of detentions in 2019, most often an asylum claim. Recent delays in processing such claims may have made thus removals harder. This is partly because people may develop stronger ties in the UK over time, which may make them eligible to remain on human rights grounds. Further delays in processing further submissions – additional claims for protection on asylum or human rights grounds – from refused asylum seekers were another significant barrier to removals, according to a 2015 inspection. A UNCHR audit of a small sample of cases found that it took the Home Office on average more than 9 months to adjudicate further submissions. Some return operations were also hampered by inefficient IT and case management systems, as indicated by a 2023 report on foreign national offenders.
• Cooperation with origin countries and third countries. Cooperation from origin countries is often essential for returns, particularly to secure travel documents. A 2014/15 inspection report found that the inability to obtain documents was the most common reason officials decided against detaining individuals liable for removal. Measuring changes in cooperation is difficult as it often arises from informal relationships rather than formal agreements. The impact of Brexit is likely to have been minimal – the decline in returns predates it, and, in practice, few people were returned under the Dublin Agreement (an average of 560 a year between 2008 and 2020).

The initial decline in returns in the late 2010s thus seems to have been driven by a combination of resource constraints, increased legal challenges, administrative delays, and fewer people being referred to Immigration Enforcement. The subsequent increase in returns may have resulted from a combination of budget increases and higher immigration. Higher immigration will have increased the number of recently arrived migrants, who are easier to return. For more details, see Deportation and removal: what is driving the numbers?

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Where do people returned from the UK come from?

Five countries of nationality accounted for 61% of the roughly 38,000 people returned from the UK in 2025 – India, Brazil, Albania, Romania, and Nigeria. Much of the yearly increase in total returns was driven by nationalities with already high numbers of returns, such as India and Brazil (Table 1). However, there were also some increases in returns to countries to which the UK had recently returned few migrants, such as Colombia.

In general, nationalities with large populations living in the UK are also more common among returnees. However, some countries of nationality are overrepresented among people returned from the UK. The most notable example is Albania – the number of returned Albanians increased rapidly in the early 2020s, following a new bilateral agreement and an unusual spike in the number of Albanian small boat arrivals in 2022. However, these unauthorised arrivals fell sharply in subsequent years, and returns of Albanians declined in 2025.

Table 1

Returns of many nationalities fell significantly between 2015 and 2025. This includes some countries of nationality to which the UK still returns comparatively many people, such as China (-55%) or Nigeria (-45%). Particularly sharp declines in returns were seen among citizens of Pakistan (-76%), Bangladesh (-86%), Nepal (-70%), and Sri Lanka (-76%). In comparison, total returns fell by 12% in the decade to 2025. Because the government does not publish data on the number of people identified as liable for removal, it is difficult to know if there has been any change in the rates at which unauthorised migrants are removed.

There were also some countries of nationality for which returns increased significantly during this period. These include Brazil and Albania, and several other countries in Eastern Europe (Romania, Bulgaria), Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan), and Latin America (Honduras, Colombia).

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How many refused asylum seekers are returned from the UK?

In 2025, around 11,600 people who had previously claimed asylum were recorded leaving the UK, the highest number since comparable records began in 2010. These figures include refused asylum seekers who had exhausted all avenues of appeal, those granted protection but removed for other reasons such as criminal behaviour, and people who left voluntarily before receiving a decision.

Asylum returns also made up an increased share of all returns in 2025, at 31% (Figure 3). This may reflect higher asylum applications and larger numbers of refusals.

Figure 3

In theory, people who are refused asylum and have exhausted all rights of appeal do not have a right to stay in the UK and are liable for removal. However, in recent years many refused asylum seekers were not removed from the UK. Of all asylum applications submitted between 2010 and 2022 which had been refused by the end of 2025, around half had resulted in a return from the UK by this date.

It is the oldest and the most recent refused claims among this group that have a higher likelihood of having resulted in a return from the UK. This reflects the sharp drop in returns in the second half of the previous decade, and their recovery in the 2020s. Around 72% of refused asylum seekers who first submitted a claim in 2010 had been returned by the end of 2025. That share falls to 33% among refused asylum seekers who applied in 2018, but increases to 48% among those who applied in 2022.

The share of asylum seekers denied protection and subsequently returned also varies widely by nationality. Some nationalities, such as Albanians and Brazilians, have a relatively high likelihood of being returned after a failed application. For others, the number of asylum returns has remained low despite high number of refusals in recent years. This includes citizens of Iran, Iraq, and Turkey.

Figure 4

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How many people who arrived by small boat have left the UK?

Around 2,600 people who had first arrived in the UK by small boat were returned to another country in 2025. In total, there were 7,500 such returns between 2018 and 2025 – a little under 4% of all arrivals during this period.

The government does not publish data showing how many of the 194,000 people who arrived by small boat between 2018 and 2025 and are liable for removal have left the UK. By the end of 2025, around 76,000 had been granted asylum, and 22,000 were still waiting for an initial decision on their application. Around 48,000 small boat arrivals had been refused asylum at the initial decision stage by the end of 2025, though some of these individuals will still be in the appeals system and thus not liable for removal because they may eventually be granted status in the UK. Another 33,000 had their asylum applications withdrawn or administratively decided. For more details, see People crossing the English Channel in small boats.

Most returns of small boat arrivals have been to Albania – 5,300 or 71% of the total. The government prioritised the processing of Albanian asylum applications after arrivals spiked in 2022, and overall returns to the country increased sharply after a returns agreement was signed the same year. However, around 13,000 Albanian nationals who arrived by small boat were either rejected asylum or had their application withdrawn between 2018 and 2025 – which would indicate that the majority remain in the UK without authorisation.

In addition to the usual process of removing those who are refused asylum, in August 2025 the government began returning a small number of people who arrived by small boat to France under a pilot agreement . This allows the UK to return some people after arrival, without considering their asylum application, in exchange for receiving an equivalent number of migrants from France. There were 231 returns to France in 2025. That made up around 1% of all small boat arrivals between August and December. For more details, see the UK-France small boats returns deal.

Figure 5

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How many foreign national offenders are returned from the UK?

In 2025, around 5,600 foreign national offenders (FNOs) were returned from the UK. This includes non-citizens convicted either in the UK of any criminal offence, or abroad of any serious criminal offence. Returns of FNOs increased by 84% between 2022 and 2024, reaching levels similar to those seen in the middle of the previous decade.

FNOs accounted for 15% of all returns in 2025. The share of FNO returns increased during the 2010s as numbers remained relatively stable while overall returns fell, and peaked at 35% in 2020.

Figure 6

Albanians accounted for 28% of all FNO returns in 2025, followed by Romanians (18%) and Poles (8%). These top nationalities are also those with the highest numbers among the UK’s prison population. Albanians were top nationality among FNO returns in every year after 2022, when numbers began increasing following a bilateral returns agreement between the Albanian and British governments.

The share of EU citizens among FNO returns increased from 18% in 2010 to 69% in 2019, before falling to 49% in 2025. FNOs made up 58% of all returns of EU nationals in 2025, though this fell from a high of 98% in 2020. This is in part the consequence of non-FNO returns to the EU having increased now that EU nationals do not have the implicit right to reside in the UK as they did under free movement.

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Do return agreements work?

The current and previous governments both sought to increase returns by negotiating more agreements with countries of origin. Such deals can streamline procedures, make it easier to obtain travel documentation, and incentivise cooperation.

The UK had valid return agreements with 19 countries as of early March 2026, according to a Freedom of Information request submitted by the Migration Observatory. These include (agreement dates in brackets): Albania (2021), Algeria (2006), Bangladesh (2024), China (2004), Ethiopia (2023), France (2025), Georgia (2023), India (2021), Iraq (2025), Kuwait (2012), Moldova (2024), Nigeria (2022), Pakistan (2022), Serbia (2022), Somalia (2016), South Korea (2011), Switzerland (2005), Vietnam (2004), and Zimbabwe (2019).

A formal deal, however, is neither sufficient nor necessary to ensure a high number of returns. Several studies have found they had little to no effect on overall return rates in the EU. In the UK, many returns are to countries it does not have a formal agreement with, which together accounted for 49% of all returns in 2025. In some cases, such as Albania or India, returns rose sharply after new agreements were signed, though it remains unclear how much of the increase can be attributed to these deals. In other cases, the UK returns very few people to countries it does have an agreement with, like Somalia. Some agreements, such as the ones signed with Pakistan and Bangladesh in recent years, did not lead to a significant increase in returns.

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Evidence Gaps and Limitations

There are many evidence gaps that make it difficult to get a full picture of returns. First, published statistics provide relatively little information on the circumstances under which people return other than whether they had previously claimed asylum in the UK. There are no published statistics on returns by original visa or entry type (e.g., whether people entered without permission, or overstayed visit, work, study, or other visas).

Second, there is also no information on how long returnees had been in the UK without permission before their departure. Anyone who overstays a visa and then leaves the country, either via enforced or voluntary return, can be included in returns statistics, regardless of the length of overstay. This means we do not know the extent to which returned individuals had lived and worked without authorisation in the UK for a substantial period, as opposed to those who overstayed their visa for only a few days.

A third major problem is the limited data on how many people are potentially subject to removal action. Using current statistics, it is hard to know whether the 2010s decline in returns, and the subsequent increase, resulted from more unauthorised migrants being identified by Immigration Enforcement, or from them being able to remove more of those who are identified in the first place. This matters because it affects how we interpret the figures. For example, declining returns could, in theory, result from higher compliance (e.g., less unauthorised entry and fewer people overstaying), or less successful enforcement. More detailed data are needed to determine this.

In response to Freedom of Information requests, the Home Office said it did not hold data on the following: the number of people issued notices of liability to remove who were subsequently granted legal status (e.g., following a human rights claim); the number of foreign national offenders of different nationalities who had been removed vs. not removed after finishing a prison sentence; and the number of people detained ahead of removal (as opposed to detained for initial processing). In early 2025, the Home Office declined to provide data on the number or nationalities of people arrested in immigration raids, or updated figures on the number of legal challenges raised in detention and their outcomes, on the basis that it intended to publish the figures in future – though no additional data had been released at the time of writing.

In addition, relatively little is known about the personal or demographic characteristics of those returned, beyond their age, sex, and nationality. Age, sex, and specific nationality breakdowns are not provided for the returns of asylum seekers; and for FNOs, only nationality breakdowns are provided. Nor are data regularly published on how long returnees have lived in the UK, where they lived, whether they were settled residents, or whether they were work, study, or family migrants.

Acknowledgements

With thanks to CJ McKinney for providing valuable feedback on previous drafts of this briefing.